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ABSTRACT

A Study of Pre and Post Cold War
Presidential International
Crisis Rhetoric
by
Flora A .Jackson
Dr. Thomas Burkholder, Thesis Committee Chair
Professor of Communication
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examines three speeches delivered by U.S. presidents during times of
international crises, W oodrow W ilson’s speech on April 2, 1917, George H. W. B ush’s
speech delivered on January 16, 1991, and the speech by George W. Bush delivered on
September 20, 2001. Elements of epideictic, deliberative and forensic strategies were
applied to the discourse to determine whether the speeches conform ed to expectations for
presidential international crisis rhetoric. This thesis extends a study completed in 1989 in
which Bonnie J. Dow argued that only epideictic and deliberative strategies appear in
international crisis rhetoric. In contrast, this study found that, in order for the discourse
to be effective, a combination of epideictic, deliberative and forensic strategies m ust be
present in international crisis rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 1

m T R O D U C T IO N

To establish crisis rhetoric as a genre, critics need to examine the fu ll
range o f such discourse, determine the role o f substantive, stylistic, and
situational elements, and give attention to the functions o f the discourse.
With such analysis, generic treatment o f crisis rhetoric could be more
useful and illuminating. (Bonnie J. Dow, 1989)

In a study published in 1989, Bonnie J. Dow exam ines speeches delivered by former
president Ronald Reagan following the bom bing of a U.S. M arine barracks in Beirut,
Lebanon, the U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, and the Soviet
attack on a Korean airliner (295). She concludes that these speeches share situational and
strategic elements that she tentatively labels as characteristics o f presidential “crisis
rhetoric.” However, Dow recognizes that her study, like others that preceded it, is limited
by the small num ber of texts exam ined and calls for subsequent research to test her
conclusions (308). Dow says critics should exam ine a full range of discourse, including
presidential speeches delivered prior to W orld W ar II.
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Based on the invitation from Dow to investigate other presidential discourse to
determine whether this type of crisis rhetoric is a genre, this study exam ines speeches by
three American Presidents given in a time of U nited States military action to determine
whether they share situational and strategic elements that Dow labels as characteristics of
presidential crisis rhetoric. The speeches include: President W oodrow W ilson’s April 2,
1917, speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war on Germany; President George
H. W. B ush’s January 16, 1991, address to the nation announcing allied m ilitary action in
the Persian Gulf; and President George W. B ush’s September 20, 2001, address before a
joint session of Congress on the United States Response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
W hile there are a good num ber of speeches from which to choose, the scope of this
study limits the num ber that can successfully be analyzed. Therefore, by com pleting a
thorough comparison o f W ilson’s speech and both of the B ushes’ speeches to determine
whether there are significant differences and/or similarities in the rhetoric, evidence of
the shared situational and strategic elements should support the claim that this type of
presidential crisis rhetoric is a genre.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the rhetorical presidency and the value of a
generic classification of presidential international crisis rhetoric. Then, a justification for
the three speeches selected for this study is offered. This chapter concludes with a
preview of the following chapters of this study.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Rhetorical Presidency
Amos Kiewe explains that the rhetorical presidency began with Theodore Roosevelt
and W oodrow W ilson and is based on the popular appeal of the president (xvi). M odem
presidents use symbols and images in defining and constructing the reality of situations
they want their audiences to accept, and, according to Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and
Kathleen Hall Jam ieson, “Skillful presidents [ . . . ] engage in a process o f transforming
those who hear them into the audiences they desire” (5).
Campbell and Jam ieson’s book. Deeds Done in W ords, addresses presidential rhetoric
that has developed over time. They say that, “Presidential rhetoric is one source of
institutional power, enhanced in the m odem presidency by the ability of presidents to
speak when, where, and on whatever topic they choose, and to a national audience
through coverage by the electronic m edia” (3). They explain that the identity of the
institution of the presidency arises out of the discourse (4). In addition, they state that
modem presidents have created forms of discourse, or genres, that carry forward policy,
mark beginnings and endings of situations, preserve the institution of the presidency,
adapting it to changing times and conditions (4).

The Value of a Generic Classification of Rhetoric
A study of genre, according to Campbell and Jamieson, “would produce a
critical history exploring the ways in which rhetorical acts influence each other”
(1978 26). They say that:
Because rhetoric is of the public life, because rhetorical acts are
concem ed with ideas and processes rooted in the here and now of
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social and political life, rhetoric develops in tim e and through time.
Ironically, the traditional emphasis on individual speeches and
speakers as rooted historically in a particular time and place is, in
an important sense, anti-historical, because it fails to recognize the
im pact of rhetorical acts on other rhetorical acts, and it fails to
recognize the powerful human forces which fuse recurrent forms
into genres which, in an important sense, transcend specific time
and place. (1978 26)
A ccording to Campbell and Jamieson (1990), rhetorical genres perform specific
functions in specific situations. They say that a genre “persists only as long as it remains
a functional response to exigencies” (104). They also say that genres em phasize social
and historical areas of rhetoric. Edwin Black (1978) suggests that there are limited
situations in which rhetors can find themselves, as well as limitations in how they
respond (133). He also says that critics can draw upon historical responses to construct a
generic approach to other sim ilar situations (133). It appears from these observations by
Campbell, Jamieson, and Black that, by using a generic approach to analyze a particular
piece o f discourse, critics will be able to understand more fully how a genre has
developed over time.
It is also im portant to consider that when a rhetorical act is identified as a part of a
genre, it should, according to Kathryn M. Olson (1993) be “rehistorized” (sic) (299).
Olson says that by “rehistorizing (sic) a generic perspective can make a further
contribution to the understanding of how the rhetoric o f public and social life develops
‘in time and over tim e’” (300). In other words, rehistorizing can offer insight to the
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impact of rhetorical discourse on another rhetorical act, such as what this proposed study
hopes to find in the presidential crisis rhetoric of W ilson, George H. W. Bush and George
W. Bush.
Also important to the study of rhetorical genre is that genres are subjected to the
pressures of changes in expectations of purpose, “and as rhetorical action establishes new
precedents, advocates alter and expand existing genres or develop substitute forms better
suited to achieve their ends” (Campbell and Jamieson 1990 104). Their exam ple of this
type of metamorphosis is found in the chapter on presidential w ar rhetoric.
Campbell and Jam ieson (1978) state that “presidential war rhetoric illustrates both
rhetorical continuity and adaptation to altered circumstances” (104). They continue by
arguing that throughout the history of the United States, presidential war rhetoric exhibits
five fundamental characteristics. These characteristics, according to Campbell and
Jamieson are:
(1) every element in it proclaims that the momentous decision to resort to
force is deliberate, the product of thoughtful consideration; (2) forceful
intervention is justified through a chronicle or narrative from which
argumentative claims are drawn; (3) the audience is exhorted to unanimity
of purpose and total com m itm ent; (4) the rhetoric not only justifies the use
o f force but also seeks to legitimize presidential assumption of the
extraordinary powers of the com m ander in chief; and as a function of
these other characteristics, (5) strategic misrepresentations play an
unusually significant role in its appeals. (105)
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A Definition of Crisis Rhetoric and Justification
for the Speeches Selected
The three speeches to be analyzed for this study were chosen because, like those used
by earlier critics, they fit into the generally accepted definition o f international crisis.
M urray Edelm an (1977) says that, “the word ‘crisis’ connotes a threat or emergency
people must face together” and that it “suggests a need for unity and for common
sacrifice” (45).
Michael B recher and Jonathan W ilkenfeld (1997) also offer a definition of
international crisis. They say that,
“There are two defining conditions of an international crisis: (1) a change
in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is hostile verbal or
physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened
probability of m ilitary hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their
relationship and challenges the structure of an international system —
global, dominant, or subsystem.” (5)
Brecher and W ilkenfeld also say that, “crisis is also closely linked to war" (6) and that
the “occurrence of war at any point in the evolution of a crisis intensifies disruptive
interaction, along with perceived harm and stress” (6). They conclude by saying that, “In
fact, war is a subset of crises; that is, all wars result from crises, but not all crises lead to
war” (7). Edelman says that war is a response to a foreign threat and that sacrifices are
made disproportionately. For example, the groups o f people making the majority of
sacrifices during war are m ilitary personnel and poor people (45).
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President W ilson’s speech asking congress to declare war on G erm any is one
example of how a crisis can lead to war. The events leading up to U nited States
involvement in W orld W ar I fit into Brecher and W ilkenfeld’s definition of crisis.
American ships were sunk and American lives were lost because of German submarine
warfare. W ilson believed it was necessary for the United States, as a newly formed
world power, to show its strength and power against a country that he believed did not
value human lives and independence. W ilson’s April 2, 1917, speech has not yet been
analyzed as a form of presidential international crisis rhetoric and would satisfy D ow ’s
invitation to study a speech presented prior to W orld W ar 11. W ilson’s speech will also
provide a sample of pre-Cold W ar rhetoric. Jim A. Kuypers (1997) considers that the
Cold W ar period from 1947 and 1991 is the framing device for presidential crisis rhetoric
(15). 1 argue that W ilson’s speech is a part of the genre of presidential crisis rhetoric and
believe my study will prove my argument to be valid.
After the end of the Cold W ar period, America was faced with “the new post Cold
W ar era” (Foreign Affairs 1990/1991) of peace and negotiation. However, the President
was faced with the responsibility to protect America and the w orld from a dictator with
few scruples. President George H. W. Bush was faced with a crisis in the Persian Gulf.
For six months prior to the United States’ military action following Saddam H ussein’s
attacks on Kuwait, the President worked with other world leaders in the United Nations
Security Council to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. This was a time during the
“embryonic post-Cold W ar world order” (Foreign Affairs 1990 - 1991 1), and that
domination by a pow er of an area of the world that held resources “vital to the well-being
of the international” (Foreign Affairs 1990 - 1991 1) could not be permitted. President
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Bush had begun a secretly approved military operation to bomb Iraq from the air and on
the sea that was set to occur in mid-January 1991 (Brecher and W ilkenfeld 1997 317).
Brecher and W ilkenfeld state that, “this decision triggered a full-scale crisis for the U.S.
because it generated three defining conditions of a crisis — basic value threat, nam ely the
human and material costs of war, finite time, and the higher likelihood of m ilitary
hostilities” (317). After further attempts to force Saddam Hussein out of K uw ait failed,
on January 16, 1991, President Bush announced that military action against Iraq would
occur in ju st a matter o f hours. W hile a number of scholars have analyzed this speech, 1
will apply D ow ’s approach to a generic classification to the text.
Finally, 1 believe it is important to include an analysis of the speech given by
President George W. Bush on Septem ber 20, 2001, after the terrorists attacked America.
Terrorists had infiltrated the country and attacked the innocent people o f the United
States on their own soil. On Septem ber 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the W orld Trade
Center, the Pentagon, and two passenger airlines proved that the United States is not
impervious to invasion by people who seek to destroy our country’s quest for peace and
power. President George W. Bush was suddenly confronted with encouraging strength in
American citizens while dealing with the devastation of lives and collateral damage and
making the decision to seek and destroy those responsible for the attacks. On September
20, 2001, Bush addressed the U nited States Congress and the people of America and the
world, announcing A m erica’s intent to destroy any person or country that had any
involvement in the events of Septem ber 11'*’. The American people responded as they
did in both W orld W ar 1 and W orld W ar 11; patriotism soared. According to R. Kenton
Bird and Elizabeth Barker Brandt, the shock of the attacks on the W orld Trade Center,
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the Pentagon, and two American passenger airlines was even greater than the attacks on
Pearl Harbor in 1941. This was a time when United States citizens were confused about
what caused the events and wondered about the security o f our country.
The selected speeches by Presidents W ilson, George H. W. Bush, and George W.
Bush will be analyzed by applying the three factors that Dow calls situational and
strategic elements in presidential crisis rhetoric. Again, these factors are (1) response to
the situation; (2) the audience’s needs; and (3) the speaker’s purpose (296). Olson says
that it is incumbent on the critic to provide evidence of the situation as perceived by the
rhetor. This evidence can be drawn from the texts of the discourse and other information
concerning the situation examined by the critic.
W hether one is identifying a ‘new ’ genre or classifying a rhetorical act as
a member of a recognized genre, then, a convincing case that a particular
rhetoric (sic) act is an em bodim ent of a specific genre depends
significantly on the critic’s evidence that the rhetor perceived his or her
situation in a particular way. The critic’s perception alone that the two
situations are similar is insufficient grounds to support the claim that a
genre is present. (304)
She continues to caution critics by stating that, “Because different participants (e.g.,
the rhetor, the im mediate audience, later audiences, a critic) may have different, even
conflicting perceptions of the rhetor’s situation, it is imperative to elevate one situational
perception as authoritative for the purpose o f detecting the presence of a genre” (303).
Olson also cautions that, “the success of a generic em bodiment must be evaluated by
exam ining an intended audience’s response to the rhetor’s choices” (304). In addition.
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she says that it is also im portant to examine how rhetors use historical discourse to
benefit their current situation.
Carolyn M iller (1984) offers that for the term “genre” to be useful as a theory or
critical approach, it m ust not simply refer to just any type of discourse. A particular
rhetorical genre must be a sound and stable method of classification (151). She continues
by stating that genres are “typified rhetorical actions based on recurrent situations” (159).
M iller says that there are specific problems that have not been considered in previous
attempts to define a rhetorical genre. One problem, she says, is that the relationship
between the rhetor and his/her perception of the situation needs to be understood.
Another problem M iller points out is in understanding how (the rhetor’s use of
symbolism) and substance (the use of semantics) fuse a generic form together in the
situation. A third problem she sees is placing a type of generic discourse on what she
calls “a hierarchal scale of generalizations about language use” (155).
M iller provides a rationale for the study of a rhetorical genre. She says:
To base a classification of discourse upon recurrent situation or, more
specifically, upon exigence understood as social motive, is to base it upon
the typical joint rhetorical actions available at a given point in history and
culture. Studying the typical uses of rhetoric, and the forms that it takes in
those uses, tells us less about the art of the individual rhetors or the
excellence of particular texts than it does about the character of a culture
or an historical period. (158)
Exam ination of the texts for this study should reveal similarities in situation and
purpose based on the definition of an international crisis. W hat the analysis should show

10
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is a difference in response by the audience, both implicitly and explicitly, for each act. In
addition, this study should reveal how each of the United States Presidents uses the
tradition of the role of the President to rhetorically respond to crisis situations.
With D ow ’s invitation to continue the study of presidential crisis rhetoric and the
advice of other scholars, such as Olson and Miller, I will examine other works of scholars
concerning presidential crisis rhetorical situations, the rhetor’s motives, as well as what
scholars say about generic criticism and the function of epideictic, deliberative, and
forensic strategies used in presidential crisis rhetoric.

Preview of Following Chapters
Chapter 2, The Literature Review, will include a review and discussion of prior
studies concerning presidential crisis rhetoric as a genre, including any current studies of
the texts. Since there appear to be very few studies completed by others than Windt,
Cherwitz, Zagacki, and Dow, this section may be limited.
Chapter 3 discusses the historical background and rhetorical problems faced by each
rhetor during the time leading up to the crisis discourse.
Chapter 4 provides a textual analysis of the discourse by applying the characteristics
of crisis rhetoric.
Chapter 5 concludes this study and provides a discussion based on the results o f the
critical analysis of each of the documents used in this study as they apply to the genre of
presidential crisis rhetoric. Questions that will be addressed will include: (1) is rhetorical
history being repeated each time a situation occurs where the United States is faced with
a threat to its position as the w orld’s most powerful nation? A num ber of scholars agree

11
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that a generic study o f discourse is important to discover how rhetorical acts influence
one another. If critics observe historical issues concerning crisis rhetoric, situational
com ponents will help the critic understand the im pact of a rhetorical genre over time; (2)
Does the A m erican’s public opinion of the situation and the rhetor affect the intended
result of the act?; And finally, (3) are the claims by Dow, Campbell, Jamieson, and others
concerning similarities in situation, strategic response and needs o f the audience in
presidential crisis rhetoric evident in the documents?

12
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will examine the definition of an international crisis on which critics
have based their studies and how critics explain presidential crisis rhetoric by a review
existing literature. A definition of international crisis is important because this type of
crisis usually results in military actions or war. The literature that is reviewed in this
chapter has been selected because it provides a num ber of frameworks that can be
considered when analyzing presidential crisis rhetoric for a generic classification.

A Definition of International Crisis
M urray Edelman (1977) says that, “the word ‘crisis’ connotes a threat or emergency
people must face together” and that it “suggests a need for unity and for common
sacrifice” (45).
M ichael Brecher and Jonathan W ilkenfeld (1997) also offer a definition of
international crisis. They say that.
There are two defining conditions of an international crisis: (I) a change
in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is hostile verbal or
physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened
probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their

13
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relationship and challenges the structure of an international system —
global, dominant, or subsystem. (5)
Brecher and W ilkenfeld also say that, “crisis is also closely linked to war" (6) and that
the “occurrence of war at any point in the evolution of a crisis intensifies disruptive
interaction, along with perceived harm and stress” (6). They conclude by saying that, “In
fact, w ar is a subset of crises; that is, all wars result from crises, but not all crises lead to
war” (7). Edelm an says that war is a response to a foreign threat and that sacrifices are
made disproportionately. For example, the groups o f people making the majority of
sacrifices during war are military personnel, and the poor people (45).

The Definition of International Crisis and Its
Application to Crisis Rhetoric
Prior studies by Theodore Windt, and Richard Cherwitz and Richard Zagacki that
Bonnie J. Dow refers to in her study concern a type of presidential crisis rhetoric that
W indt labels “international crisis rhetoric.” Specificity of this type o f rhetoric is
important because crises can take on a broad range of definitions. W indt says that the
term “crisis” became popular during John F. Kennedy’s presidency to describe difficult
decisions K ennedy had to make. Richard Nixon continued to use the term crisis in the
same context during his administration (92) and we hear Presidents using the same term
today.
W indt argues that, “a crisis that does not involve an external m ilitary attack on the
United States is a political event rhetorically created by the President in which the public
predictably rallies to his defense” (92). He also argues that tradition and precedents play

14
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a part in the rhetorical act. W indt says that when Presidents declare a situation as a crisis,
they first tell the people that a dangerous situation exists and that they, the Presidents,
m ust decide how to address the situation. Secondly, Presidents state that this new
situation is a continuation of ongoing serious differences between beliefs and principals.
Lastly, Presidents ask the people to take the “moral high ground,” and accept and support
the actions they have taken. W indt says that the rhetoric in these types of situations is
declaratory (98).
Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) suggest that the techniques and strategies in presidential
crisis rhetoric are of two varieties, justificatory and consummatory. They describe
justificatory rhetoric as when the President focuses his remarks on the explanation and
rationalization for military retaliation. Consummatory rhetoric, on the other hand,
provides a warning or a threat that any future violent acts will be answered. When
looking at the language used in both justificatory and consumm atory discourse they state
that,
both employ deliberate, hard-hitting, offensive language to dramatize
perpetration of crises; while attempting to create crisis atmospheres, both
seek resolution, eliminating the need for further moves and countermoves
which could escalate emergencies to dangerous if not catastrophic levels;
and both underscore the importance o f American ideals and values, using
crises to reinforce and reaffirm the superiority o f American democratic
principles to aggressive, terroristic and uncivilized attributes exemplified
by perpetrators. (309-310)

15
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Cherwitz and Zagacki claim that other differences in the varieties of discourse are
found in the tone o f the rhetoric. Justificatory rhetoric is “irrevocable, direct and
decisive, announcing concrete, definitive” (310) military response to violent actions by a
foreign nation. They also say that consumm atory discourse is circumspect and
“emphasizes the im portance of caution, patience, resolve and inner strength in reacting to
wrongful deeds” (310) com m itted by aggressors and the act of patience is depicted as a
virtue and not a sign of weakness or indecisiveness.
In a critical analysis of the rhetoric of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s speeches
concerning the Tonkin G ulf crisis, Cherwitz (1998) states that, “Although physical moves
are usually associated with crisis during conflicts between two nations, it is often the
president’s rhetoric that draws attention to the situation, and defines it in such a way that
the nation’s response is clearly im plied” (100). In his analysis of the speeches presented
by President Johnson on August 4 and 5, 1964, Cherwitz says that, “Johnson’s rhetoric
created an international crisis” (94). Cherwitz says that in each of his speeches,
Johnson’s message revealed a justificatory variety of rhetoric. He also describes the
language used in the speech as contributing to the impression of a crisis.
D ow ’s study claims that the studies of presidential crisis rhetoric conducted by W indt
in 1973, and Cherwitz and Zagacki in 1986, overlook the elements of how different
situations that give rise to crisis rhetoric call for different responses. Dow looks at three
speeches by President Ronald Reagan: the address in September, 1983 following an
attack on a Korean airliner by the Soviet Union; the address on the events in Lebanon and
Grenada in October of 1983; and the April 1986 speech following the United States air
strikes on Libya (295).

16
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Dow describes these speeches as having occurred because o f tw o different situations.
She says that, in the case of the speeches concerning the Korean airliner and the events in
Lebanon when United States M arines were attacked and killed by hostile forces, the
American public had already perceived that events were a significant crisis before the
President gave his address (295). Then, in the case of Grenada and Libya, it was the
President’s address stating the action taken by America against the terrorist attacks that
resulted in the public’s perception of the situations as crises (295). She goes on to argue
that there is an important difference in these two types of crisis rhetoric. In the instance
of R eagan’s speech concerning Lebanon, current public opinion was that a crisis existed,
yet in the instance of the other two speeches, R eagan’s rhetoric created the crises in order
to gain public support for the action taken. Dow then states that there are three factors
that vary significantly in different types of crisis situations. These factors are response to
the situation, the audience’s needs; and the speaker’s purpose (296).
Dow contends that the study o f presidential crisis rhetoric should take into
consideration the exigencies giving rise to the discourse, that different situations require
different responses, and that crisis rhetoric should be analyzed based on an understanding
of how the rhetorical discourse responds to the exigencies created by the situation (295).
An earlier article by Lloyd F. Bitzer (1968) supports D ow ’s contention.
Bitzer states that the “situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity and
[.. .] of rhetorical criticism ” (6). He claims that there are three com ponents of any
rhetorical situation: exigence, the audience, and constraints (6). According to Bitzer, a
controlling exigence will serve as the organizing factor in the rhetorical situation. This
controlling exigence will specify “the audience to be addressed and the change to be
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effected” (7). The audience will consist of those people who can be influenced by the
rhetoric and can serve as “mediators of change” (8). The limitations, or constraints as
stated by Bitzer, which are a part of the rhetorical situation are made up of “people,
events, objects and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power
to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (8). Bitzer continues by
stating, “There are two main classes of constraints. The first is those originated or
managed by the rhetor and his method, and the second, those other constraints, in the
situation, which may be operative” (8). He also says that the rhetor must know which
constraints must be determined as either proper or improper for the situation.
B itzer’s analysis can be com pared to a study conducted by James W. Pratt (1970).
Pratt claims that, “Events of crisis should produce rhetorical acts which are related to the
situation of crisis” (194), and that the speeches presented during crisis situations should
have “distinctive identifiable characteristics” (194). He examines three speeches
delivered at different times of “generally recognized international crisis” (195). The
speeches were delivered by President D wight Eisenhower on October 31, 1956,
concerning the Suez crisis. President John Kennedy on October 22, 1962, about the
Cuban missile crisis, and by President Lyndon Johnson on August 4, 1964, during the
G ulf of Tonkin crisis.
Pratt’s analyses of the speeches revealed that Eisenhower and Johnson’s situations
shared the same characteristics in that the American audience already knew about the
events. K ennedy’s speech, however, did not share the same characteristics because most
of the American public probably did not know about the crisis situation, and Americans
were hearing about it for the first time. Pratt says that each of the presidents assumed
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different roles that affected the type of speeches that were delivered. He claims that both
Eisenhower and Johnson assumed the role of “reporter,” while Kennedy spoke in the first
person and as the President. He continues by saying that,
An examination of the public responses to these speeches - or the critical
reactions to them - might also suggest which of these strategies is most
effective or appropriate in crisis settings. On the basis of these three
speeches, it appears that the speaking characteristics of the president
involved and the specific nature of the crisis setting combine to determine
the type of speech which will result [ . . . ] . (202)
Pratt concludes by stating that examining the speeches as a rhetorical genre should add to
the process of our understanding of communication during crisis situations (203).

The Argument Against Generic Classification
of International Crisis Rhetoric
There are some scholars who believe that classification of presidential international
crisis rhetoric as a genre results in ambivalence. Blair and Houck argue that the studies
of presidential crisis rhetoric as a genre pose two ambivalences - one concerning the
status of the genre and the other concerning the relationship of the situation to the crisis
rhetoric (92). They refer to P ratt’s study as evading the issue of what constitutes a genre
of presidential crisis rhetoric by merely assuming there are clear cases of crisis rhetoric,
and proceed to criticize W indt for assuming the particular genre and simply using his
analysis o f K ennedy’s Cuban M issile crisis speech and N ixon’s Cambodia speech to
support the genre’s characteristics (Blair and Houck 93). They also criticize Cherwitz
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and Zagacki for agreeing with other scholars that the genre exists; yet they deny that their
study defines a generic classification. Blair and Houck also argue that D ow is ambivalent
concerning the generic classification of presidential crisis rhetoric because, D ow argues,
not all of the presidential rhetoric relating to crises has been exam ined (Blair and Houck
94). Turning from the ambivalence in the status of the genre, Blair and H ouck discuss
the ambivalence in the relationship of the situation to the rhetoric.
Arguing that critics have either considered or assumed that there is a relationship
between situation and crisis rhetoric, Blair and Houck offer exam ples of what critics say
about situation. They state that both Pratt and W indt stipulate a limitation of the situation
by exam ining speeches involving international circumstances; Cherwitz and Zagacki
studied speeches concerning attacks on American property or people by foreign powers;
and Dow exam ined speeches concerning military attacks on American non-combatants
outside of wartime (Blair and Houck 95). Blair and Houck argue that a generic claim of
crisis rhetoric cannot be limited to international crises and offer W indt’s characterization
of the stages of crisis rhetoric to support their claim. They go on to say that
“philosophical arguments over rhetoric’s general situated or situation-generating
character at large” (97) cannot support D ow ’s claim of two types of crisis rhetoric rhetorical responses to “real” crises, and rhetorical responses that create crises (Blair and
Houck 97). Blair and Houck then offer a solution to what they believe to be difficulties
experienced by W indt, Cherwitz, Zagacki, and Dow to generically categorize crisis
rhetoric. They say that critics should consider “rethinking rhetorical genre as a critical
heuristic” (98) therefore making the generic category a hypothetical premise. In essence,
Blair and Houck believe that a generic classification limits how speeches are analyzed.
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They state that critics are not “confined to the question; W hat speeches are contained
within this genre? She or he may ask instead: W hat is this speech like if it is read as a
crisis speech?” (99).
Blair and Houck use this premise to analyze N ixon’s speeches on his Vietnamization
policy on November 13, 1969, the Cambodian incursion speech of April 30, 1970, his
speech regarding mining Haiphong Harbor delivered on M ay 8, 1972, and three other
speeches not related to international events. They treat these exam ples of “presidential
crisis rhetoric as an entreaty by a president to the nation to see itself seriously and
immediately threatened and to conduct itself as such” (99), and addressed the issues of
situation, perception, and honesty. Blair and Houck found that there were “striking
sim ilarities’ (107) in all of the speeches, which seemed to them remarkable because the
situations in which they were delivered were not the same.
Three of N ixon’s speeches concerned circumstances in the Vietnam conflict, a fourth
speech concerned issues of economic policy, and the last two concerned the W atergate
investigation (107). Blair and Houck were able to find one common element in all of the
speeches - “either a potential threat to N ixon’s political status or the complete absence of
threat to him or the nation. In fact, threats to N ixon’s popularity, ideology, or status in
office appear to have been the only ‘crisis’ addressed by these speeches, even though
each crisis was couched as a threat to a larger group or principal” (108).
The heuristic approach of simply analyzing speeches as crisis rhetoric has been taken
by a num ber of other critics. Amos Kiewe (1994) compiled a collection of essays that
studied presidential crisis rhetoric from Truman through George H. W. Bush that include
Blair and H ouck’s study. Kiewe supports the notion that critics who have argued for a
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generic classification have been challenged. He notes that the purpose of his compilation
is to enlighten the student of presidential crisis rhetoric of the role of the president during
a crisis situation and to illuminate certain features and patterns of presidential behaviors
as the behaviors relate to the speeches. The essays included are representative o f a
longitudinal study of various discourses of a crisis’s life cycle, or o f several crises in one
presidency (xv) and depict how presidents construct their responses during crisis
situations. Exam ples of the studies included are: Robert L. Ivie’s “Declaring a National
Emergency: Trum an’s Rhetorical Crisis and the Great Debate of 1951;” “Eisenhower,
Little Rock, and the Rhetoric of Crisis” by M artin J. M edhurst; Enrico Pucci, Jr.’s “Crisis
as Pretext: John P. Kennedy and the Rhetorical Construction of the Berlin Crisis;” and
Kurt R itter’s “Lyndon B. Johnson’s Crisis Rhetoric after the Assassination of John F.
Kennedy: Securing Legitimacy and Leadership.” Crisis rhetoric of Presidents Gerald
Ford, Jim m y Carter, Ronald Reagan, and two studies concerning the rhetoric o f George
H. W. Bush are also part of K iew e’s compilation. Kiewe advises critics to be “cautious
not to be constrained by the generic approach and to consider crisis rhetoric as a premise
to be used in reading a variety o f speeches” (xxxiii).
W hile Kiewe examines crisis rhetoric during the Cold W ar Era, Jim A. Kuypers looks
at the Post Cold W ar crisis rhetoric of President Bill Clinton. K uypers’ study concerns
how a president is able to construct a response to a crisis situation without being able to
draw from the Cold W ar meta-narrative in order to frame the situation as an international
crisis (3), and how the press can frame the situation so that the public will interpret it “in
a specific m anner” (10). By im plementing W indt’s theory of crisis formation, Kuypers
studies how a president uses resources to frame the situation as a crisis. He “takes the
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position that the study of presidential crisis rhetoric should not primarily approach an
event as an example o f crisis (Cherwitz and Zagacki) or examine a speech/text through a
genre of crisis (Blair and Houck) or suggest a situation is already perceived as a crisis
(Dow 28). Instead, K uypers’ study suggests that researchers would learn more about the
discourse if they examine “the interplay of various texts and contexts that act to alter the
situation and public perception of the situation” (28). Therefore, he says that, “criticism
of presidential crisis rhetoric should be a blend of discursive and material conditions”
(28). Kuypers claims that his study contributes to the understanding of presidential crisis
rhetoric by advancing the notion of the rhetoric “as an inter-animation of text and context
within situational constraints,” (29) as it occurs after the Cold War. The study also
contributes to the understanding of the role of the printed press as it relates to presidential
crisis rhetoric.

A Summary of Framework
Each of the scholars previously noted in this chapter have applied certain theories or
frameworks by which they have attempted to classify the rhetoric. W indt says that
historical precedents play a part in the rhetoric. Cherwitz and Zagacki state that the
rhetoric takes on either a justificatory or consumm atory tone. Dow argues that different
situations call for different responses, and it appears that her theory is supported to some
degree by both Bitzer and Pratt. W hile we have seen how Kuypers implements W indt’s
theory in his compilation of studies, no other research was found that applied the other
scholars’ theories.
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In keeping with the purpose of this study to further the research for a generic
classification of presidential international crisis rhetoric, I intend to use a combination of
W indt’s historical perspective of the rhetoric and D ow ’s framework and apply them to
the three selected speeches. This study will provide a comparison of situational
constraints that may have required certain responses. One of the questions to be
addressed is w hether or not the situation was a political event rhetorically created by the
President as W indt stated. Also, the language used by each of the rhetors will be
compared in the attempt to classify the rhetoric in a generic sense. A udience’s responses
will also be exam ined to contribute to the understanding of the effectiveness of the
rhetorical response to the situation.
The next chapter of this thesis will be an historical account of each of the rhetorical
problems faced by each of the presidents, and will reveal similarities in each president’s
situation. M ost of the studies concerning international crisis rhetoric have involved the
Cold W ar era. The rhetoric examined in this study occurred prior to and after the Cold
W ar era. This, I believe, will further support the framework of both W indt and Dow for
the generic classification of presidential crisis rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 3

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND
THE RHETORICAL PROBLEM
The previous chapter introduced a definition of international crisis rhetoric and
provided a review of some of the studies offered by scholars to understand the
characteristics of presidential international crisis rhetoric. This chapter will provide a
brief background of Presidents W ilson, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush. Then,
the crises and rhetorical problems faced by the presidents will be described to answer the
question of how the crises are defined based on situations as stated in the presidential
rhetoric.

A Brief Background of the Presidents
W oodrow W ilson was elected to his first term as President of the United Sates in
1912. W ith only two years of experience in politics as Governor of the State of New
Jersey, W ilson was recognized during his time of being governor as a possible candidate
for the presidency (U.S. Presidents xii). Prior to entering politics, W ilson was a scholar.
He held a law degree from the University of Virginia, and received a Ph.D. from Johns
Hopkins University. W ilson was also an accomplished student of government and wrote
two books. Congressional Government and Constitutional G overnm ent, as well as a
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number of articles published in the “Overland M onthly” in 1904 (Lippman 13). Another
notable fact about W ilson is that he studied rhetoric at Davidson College and Princeton
University and he “prized rhetorical performance” (Buhite xvi).
W hile W ilson was adept at composing and delivering substantive discourse due to his
schooling, A m erica’s 41st President, George H. W. B ush’s formal educational
background is very different. Unlike the scholarly education of W ilson, George H. W.
Bush attended the prestigious, private, Phillips Academy in Andover, M assachusetts, and
excelled in sports. He enlisted in the United State’s Navy after graduation and served as
a distinguished Navy pilot. After his military service, George H. W. Bush enrolled in
Yale University as a student of economics, and graduated in 1948. He then became very
successful in the oil business in Texas prior to beginning his political career. Bush was
elected United States President in 1988 and served one term. As noted on the
W hitehouse’s official W eb site, his political experience includes serving two terms as the
Congressional representative from Texas, Ambassador to the United Nations, Chairman
of the Republican National Committee, C hief of the United States Liaison Office in the
People’s Republic of China, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He
served as Vice President of the United States for President Ronald Reagan from 1981
through 1988. His first bom son, George W., followed some of the same paths in the
areas of education and in politics.
According to his biographical information available on the W hitehouse official Web
site, W hitehouse.gov, George W. Bush, like his father, received his formal education at
Yale University. He served as an F-102 fighter pilot in the Texas Air National Guard.
H e then earned a M aster of Business Administration degree from Harvard Business
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School, followed by a career in the energy business. The younger B ush’s first entry into
politics was working on his father’s presidential campaign. Before entering the political
arena as G overnor of Texas for two terms, he purchased a baseball franchise and served
as the general manager of the Texas Rangers.
W hile President Wilson was certainly more adept at political discourse than either of
the Bushes, the office of the presidency gave each of these men an opportunity to
persuade their American publics and members of the federal government to accept their
decisions regarding actions taken, or to be taken, in the events of international crises.

The Crises and Rhetorical Problems
W ilson’s Crisis
Theodore W indt says that, “ [t]he President’s perception of the situation and the
rhetoric he uses to describe it mark an event as a crisis” (92). Upon a review of the
situation leading up to A m erica’s involvement in W orld W ar I, this concept is evident in
W oodrow W ilson’s speech to Congress asking for a declaration o f war on Germany.
Up until the attacks on the British Steamer, Falaba, on March 28, 1915, the American
public believed that the Great W ar being fought in Europe would not interfere with
American lives. They then found out that an American citizen, Leon C. Thrasher,
drowned as a result of a German U-2 submarine torpedoing the Falaba (Tansill 252). On
April 28, 1915, an American steamship, the Cushing, was attacked by a German
seaplane, and on M ay 1, 1915, the Gulflight, an American tanker, was torpedoed (Tansill
262). American lives were lost on the Cushing, two crewman of the Gulflight drowned,
and the G ulflight’s captain was reported to have died of shock (Tansill 262). Then, two
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days after the attack on the Gulflight, a German submarine torpedoed the Lusitania in the
waters near Ireland’s southern coast (Tansill 265). W ith the loss of more American lives,
public opinion was m obilized against submarine warfare. Wilson, however, worked
diligently to maintain neutrality. The main issue of 1916 was the war. The Democratic
Party’s cam paign slogan was, “He kept us out of war.” (W hitney & W hitney 235).
According to Francine Sanders Romero, while citizens generally supported W ilson’s
position for the United States to remain neutral, “preparedness advocates argued that this
stance should not be pursued at the expense of military readiness” (102). Those
advocates were urging funding for the military and instituting a draft for personnel.
W hen W ilson ultimately conceded to demand funding for the military, he was criticized
for moving the United States closer to entering the war (Romero 102). W hen Germany
continued the attacks at sea without regard to the rights of humanity, W ilson addressed
the Congress o f the United States declaring G erm any’s actions as a war against the
United States and its citizens and that Congress must “take immediate steps not only to
put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and
em ploy all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end
the war” (W ilson’s 4/2/17 speech, par. 6).
W ilson’s Rhetorical Problem
W ilson’s rhetorical problem was to convince the Congress, and then the American
public, that he had no choice but to ask for a declaration of war on Germany in order to
protect freedom for all people in the world. A believer in the principal that only
Congress had the right to declare war, W ilson began his speech with, “I have called the
Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of
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policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally
permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making” (par. 1). His argument
was simply stated:
There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us.
It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the
most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seems in the
balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for
the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, - for
democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice
in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for
a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free,
(par. 19)
President W ilson described to Congress the events that he believed created the crisis.
The fact that American lives were being affected by the actions of a foreign government,
and that the motives of the German Government were against A m erica’s values of
freedom for all people in the world supported W indt’s conclusion that a crisis situation
existed.
George H. W. B ush’s Crisis
Almost 74 years later, A m erican’s were told that the United States would again enter
a war on foreign soil. President George H. W. Bush appeared on national television to
describe the military action by American forces against Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.
This situation also follows W indt’s characterization of a crisis.
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Just as Wilson watched the fighting in Europe escalate, Bush and the American public
at large watched tensions build in the Persian Gulf. According to Lester H. Brune (1993),
the last two years of the war between Iran and Iraq resulted in the formation of a multi
national naval force to ensure that the G u lfs oil shipping lanes remained open. Under
the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the United States and other Western
nations provided advanced weapons to Baghdad. Both Iran and Iraq complied with the
demand for a cease fire, ending the war in August of 1988. Not all of the Washington
leadership believed that Saddam Hussein had changed his radical views. Some believed
that he would use military strength against Israel with the weapons America had
provided. Brune states that the official policy of the Regan-Bush administration was to
continue doing business with Iraq because it would benefit “the U.S. trade balance and
strengthen W ashington’s pursuit of international restrictions on Iraq’s chemical,
biological, and nuclear w eapons” (47). This policy continued through the end of
Reagan’s administration and in to B ush’s early term. There continued to be a division of
hard and soft-line factions. Then, on March 22, 1990, the Senate approved the Jerusalem
resolution that recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Congress approved the
resolution on the following April 24"^. While Bush did not support the resolution, he
failed to lobby strongly against it. The American public had no understanding of the
issue because President Bush and the State Departm ent continued to recognize Tel Aviv
as the capital of Israel. W hen a delegation of Senators visited Saddam Hussein in Iraq
within a month after passing the resolution, Hussein began his campaign to discredit the
United States and convince the media that the United States and Israel were plotting
against the Arabs (Brune 49).
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Hussein continued making fanatical statements against the United States such as the
Arab people would suffer because the Soviets lost power to the United States. He
stressed that the United States was now the dominant power in the M iddle East and that
America must withdraw their ships from the Persian Gulf. He also said he wanted the
Arab states to pull their financial interests in American and W estern European companies
and invest in Eastern European companies and in the Soviet Union (Brune 50). The
problem that faced the Bush administration was that they had perceived Hussein as a
moderate, when in fact they had helped to create a m onster that could destroy the Middle
East (Brune 52). Saddam Hussein began his campaign of destruction with the attack on
Kuwait.
According to an account of Desert Storm compiled by writers, editors, and
correspondents of Time W arner Publishing, President George H. W. Bush first heard of
the attacks on Kuwait on August 1, 1990 at 6:30 P.M. (Friedrick 11). Crown Prince
Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah called the American Em bassy in Kuwait almost three
hours later, asking for help and also asking that his request remain confidential. An hour
later he called again to officially ask for help from the United States Government, no
longer concerned about public knowledge (Freidrick 11). It was not possible for an
immediate response of U.S. Troops because the closest military forces were some 3,000
miles away in the Indian Ocean. While the United States could not immediately respond
to the cry for help. President Bush was meeting with his advisors to consider options.
The very next day. President Bush met with reporters in the cabinet room at the White
House. Bush delivered a brief statement at a press conference on August 2, 1990,
condemning the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and stated, “W e call for the immediate
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withdrawal of all Iraqi forces.” He also informed the press in his statement that he was
exercising his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
had signed an Executive Order freezing Iraqi assets in the United States and prohibiting
any transactions with Iraq. Bush stated that the State Department had been in contact
with the governments of other countries urging their condemnation of Iraqi aggression,
and that it was important for the international community to act together to remove the
Iraqi forces from Kuwait immediately.
George H. W. B ush’s Rhetorical Problem
Gallup polls indicated that the American public was highly supportive of B ush’s
actions. However, the closer it came to American troops being deployed to fight for the
freedom of Kuwait, the polls revealed a decrease in public support. By January of 1991,
polls indicated that public support for both continuing sanctions against Iraq and going to
war with Hussein was waning. B ush’s approval rate decreased from 70% to 50% (Brune
1993). The biggest problem Bush faced was the public’s fear that this war would be just
like Vietnam (Rosenthal 1991, Brune 1993, and Pollock 1994).
In the June 15, 1991 edition of the New York Times, Andrew Rosenthal reported the
results of a New York Tim es/CBS News poll. The poll showed that 58 per cent of the
1512 people questioned approved of how the President was handling the crisis. This
group also provided insight to the public’s expectations of the anticipated military action
against Iraq. According to the article, most of the people questioned “said that they
expected the war to last several months to more than a year, to require heavy combat on
the ground, produce thousands of American deaths, and make a m ajor attack by Iraqi
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agents within the United States likely” (Rosenthal 1991). President Bush again tried to
assure people when he said in his January 16, 1991 speech.
I ’ve told the American people before that this will not be another Viet
Nam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible
support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one
hand tied behind their back. I ’m hopeful that this fighting will not go on
for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum, (par. 16)
President Bush described to the people of America and the world the events that
perpetuated the crisis. The actions of the enemy as described by the President in his
speech and witnessed by people all over the world via the vast spectrum of available
media supported W indt’s conclusion that a crisis situation existed.
George W. B ush’s Crisis
W hile Presidents Wilson and George H. W. Bush and the American public were able
to prepare for the United States involvement in World W ar I and the Persian G ulf War,
President George W. Bush and Americans faced a totally different situation that lead
America in to yet another battle. This time it was not about U. S. citizens being attacked
on foreign soil. This time it was about America under attack on its own soil without any
warning.
On Septem ber 11, 2001, the American public watched as commercial airliners flew
into the W orld Trade Center towers in New York City, and another commercial airliner
flew in to the Pentagon in W ashington, D C. Then, another commercial airliner went
down in a field near Pittsburgh. While the buildings spewed fire and smoke and people
ran away from the devastation, fellow Americans and people around the world watched
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and listened to the reports broadcast over television and radio. We were living a
nightmare in broad daylight.
According to The 9/11 Commission Report (Report) four hijacked commercial planes
began their assault on America. The first commercial airliner hit the W orld Trade
Center’s North Tow er at 8:46 AM. The South Tower was hit by a second airliner at 9:03
AM. Thirty-four minutes later, a third airliner hit the western face of the Pentagon.
Then, at 10:03 AM a fourth airliner crashed in a field near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The
total number if people killed by these four separate attacks totaled more than 2,981,
surpassing the number of people killed by the attacks by the Japanese at Pearl H arbor in
1941. The United States was under attack by terrorists.
According to the Report, America should not have been surprised, even though
everyone in America was shocked at the attack on American soil. Terrorist attacks on
Americans had been ensuing for a decade. First there was the attack on the W orld Trade
Center with a truck bomb in February of 1993. Attacks on United States Citizens in
Riyadh and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia killed 24 Americans and wounded hundreds of others
in 1995.
It was 1997 before the United States intelligence community recognized Osama Bin
Laden as a terrorist leader. Bin Laden publicly declared that “it was G od’s decree that
every M uslim should try his utm ost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere
in the world because of A m erica’s ‘occupation’ of Islam ’s holy places, and aggression
against M uslim s” (Report 2-3).
The Report states that Bin Laden’s group, al Qaeda, killed 224 people, which
included 24 Americans, and wounded thousands more people by simultaneous truck
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bomb attacks on American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in
August of 1998. A plot to bomb hotels frequented by American tourists was thwarted by
Jordanian police in Decem ber of 1999. That same month, U.S. Customs agents arrested a
member of al Qaeda at the Canadian border who was trying to smuggle in explosives to
use to attack the Los Angeles International Airport. Then in October of 2000, an
American destroyer, the USS Cole, was attacked with a motorboat filled with explosives.
A hole blown in the side of the ship almost sank the vessel and the explosion killed 17
American sailors. But nothing in the past compared to the “wake-up call” all Americans
and the United States government got on the morning of September 11, 2001.
According to an article in the New York Times by David Sanger and Don Van Natta,
when the news of the first airliner hitting a tower at Trade Center reached the President,
he was about to enter a classroom full of children at an elementary school in Sarasota,
Florida. Not knowing it to be other than an accident, he decided to stay at the event. Just
minutes later, he was advised of the second airliner hitting the other tower. President
Bush remained in his seat listening to the school children read as he received this news
and lingered for a few minutes after the children had finished. Then minutes later,
appearing before cameras in a classroom filled with teachers, staff and children, he
announced to the world the apparent terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. He then
said he would be returning to the White House immediately.
George W. B ush’s Rhetorical Problem
Bush had only been in office for just over seven months, and the way he got there was
still questionable to many. Bush needed to convince the American public that he was up
to the challenge of taking control of this situation and helping the country heal.
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R. W. Apple, Jr. provides an analysis of George W. B ush’s election to the presidency
in an article in The New York Times. He states, “Mr. Bush became the first president
since Harrison in 1888 to lose the popular vote but win the Electoral College. Only the
intervention of the United States Supreme Court, itself as deeply divided as possible, 5
votes to 4, tipped the Electoral College vote in Mr. B ush’s favor” (par. 3). Janet Elder
reported in her article dated Decem ber 18, 2000 in The New York Times that, according to
a CBS News poll. Bush would need to build public support.
Speaking to the American Public from the Texas House of Representatives after the
Supreme Courts decision. The New York Times quoted Bush as stating, “I was not elected
to serve one party, but to serve one nation. [...] W hether you voted for me or not, I will
do my best to serve your interests [...] and I will work to earn your respect.” (Sanger).
Coupling the resulting controversy of the election was B ush’s limited political
experience. As Sanger also stated. Bush had only traveled abroad three times, not
including his numerous trips to Mexico, and would be responsible for dealing with crises
in the M iddle East, and a division within his own political party concerning China, and
R ussia’s new assertiveness. So the question after the events of 9/11 was: Was this
President capable of strong leadership?
In an October 7, 2001, article in the New York Times, D. T. Max says, “In a time of
national crisis, words are key to the presidency. Too many and people tune out; too few
and they think he is hiding.” This president was not the most eloquent speaker and what
he had to say to the world would require careful construction.
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Conclusion
This historical review describes international situations that fit in with Michael
Brecher and Jonathan W ilkenfeld’s (1997) definition of international crisis. Brecher and
W ilkenfield say that the two defining conditions of an international crisis are a change in
the type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive (hostile verbal or physical)
interactions between two or more states, with a increased probability of military
hostilities, and a destabilization of their relationship that challenges the structure of a
global, dominant international system or subsystem (5). In the case of W ilson’s situation,
Germany had become a physical threat to the other neutral and friendly nations and
United States, challenging “the principals of peace and justice in the life of the w orld”
(Wilson par. 11). Saddam H ussein’s actions against the people of Kuwait are described
by George H. W. Bush as “an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all”
(par. 21). And, George W. Bush describes the attacks on the W orld Trade Towers and
the Pentagon as an act of war against the country by “enemies of freedom ” (par. 12).
The next chapter will compare their situations and apply D ow ’s theoretical
perspective of crisis rhetoric to the texts to illustrate which strategies, either epideictic or
deliberative, or a combination of both, are most appropriate based on each of the
situations. In addition, I will examine how the rhetoric reflects the personality of the
individual and how their audiences react to the discourse.
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CHAPTER 4

A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
The previous chapter presented historical details of the situations and the rhetorical
problems faced by each of the presidents. A definition of an international crisis was
applied to each situation to determine whether it satisfied the conditions of a crisis. This
chapter will apply the characteristic of crisis rhetoric in the analysis of the three speeches
selected for this study.

Characteristics of Crisis Rhetoric
Bonnie J. Dow says that different situations require different discursive responses.
The discourse can be either deliberative or epideictic depending on the exigence for the
discourse and the function that the discourse performs. According to Dow, an important
component in the strategies applied to the discourse is the audience’s role “in defining the
function of crisis rhetoric” (297). Dow admits that situations can also require elements of
both epideictic and deliberative strategies in the discourse with one of the strategies
taking prominence.
Dow, however, does not take into consideration A ristotle’s definition of deliberative
oratory. According to Aristotle, deliberative (political) oratory concerns future actions or
events (1335) whereas in D ow ’s interpretation, presidents use deliberative strategies to
“establish the expediency of action taken in an effort to gain public support” (296). In

38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

other words, presidents use deliberative strategies to convince the audience that they
made the right decision in taking the appropriate action. This explanation would seem to
me more like using forensic strategies which, in A ristotle’s definition, defend the actions
already taken by presidents. While some would argue that forensic oratory takes place in
a court room in front of a judge and possibly a jury, I would argue that the public
audience is the jury.

The Method
The method used in this study to analyze W ilson’s and the two B ush’s speeches is to
apply epideictic, deliberative and forensic strategies, or a combination of strategies, to the
discourse based on the situation the rhetor faced and the needs of the audience. This
method should result in a better understanding of whether or not the discourse was
successful in meeting the needs of the audience, based on the different situations.
Aristotle explains that the three types of discourses are determined by the listeners of
the speeches. He says that ceremonial (epideictic) discourse “either praises or censures
som ebody,” (1335) and the audience are merely observers. Political speaking
(deliberative discourse) urges the audience “to do or not do something” (1335). The
deliberative audience Aristotle referred to was made up of legislative bodies. Forensic
discourse either “attacks or defends somebody” (1335), and the audience is found in a
case of law, for example, a jury. Aristotle also explains that these three types of
discourse also refer to three different periods in time. Epideictic speakers are concerned
with the present time. Deliberative discourse concerns itself with the future, and forensic
discourse concerns itself with the past.
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Celeste M ichelle Condit (1985) argued that A ristotle’s classification o f epideictic
rhetoric no longer applied to modern rhetoric because, she claims, all types o f rhetoric
contain some measure o f praise and blame. In order for critics to understand more fully
the functions o f epideictic rhetoric, Condit assembled a set o f shared characteristics o f
epideictic discourse. These shared characteristics included the three functional pairs o f
“definition/understanding, shaping/sharing o f community, and display/entertainm ent”
(291). This updated definition o f A ristotle’s classification o f epideictic discourse allows
the critic to address the m essage content o f the rhetoric more completely.
A brief discussion o f each classification o f discourse is provided prior to applying the
strategies to the speeches.
Epideictic
According to Dow, the aim o f epideictic strategies in crisis rhetoric is to provide
communal understanding o f what has taken place. She says that until the event is
somehow aligned with past experiences, including communal beliefs and values, the
com m unity cannot com pletely understand the meaning o f the event (297). Therefore,
they must be given guidelines that can help them interpret the experience.
Condit says that epideictic strategies serve three functions for both the rhetor and the
audience. These functions include “understanding and definition, sharing and creation o f
community, and entertainm ent and display” (284). One element o f each pair fulfills
needs for the rhetor, and the other fulfills needs for the audience. Condit argues that
epideictic rhetoric will include at least one set o f these functional pairs. The
understanding and definition functional pair is said to “explain a social w orld” (288).
This function, Condit says, plays a critical role in declarations o f war, and allows the
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rhetor to explain an issue in terms of the audience’s frame of values and beliefs, thereby
making the event less threatening and confusing (288). This function also serves to give
pow er to the rhetor.
The functional pair of sharing and creation of com munity is important in epideictic
discourse because human beings need some form of symbolic sharing. Condit says that a
sense of community is shaped and maintained by hearing about the com m unity’s legacy
and character. When there is a crisis, such as war, epideictic discourse will help the
community discover what the event means, and “what the community will come to be in
the “face of the new event” (289).
Finally, the third functional pair of entertainment and display invites rhetors to
present their eloquence. Condit defines “eloquence” as “a combination of truth, beauty
and power in human speech, and is a unique capacity of humanity” (290). Although crisis
rhetoric is not at all entertaining, the ability of rhetors to display eloquence also gives
them credibility as a powerful leader. Eloquence, Condit says, is the manifestation of the
qualities of truth, beauty, power, and humanness. In epideictic speeches, the audience is
the judge of the degree of eloquence presented by the speaker.
Deliberative
Aristotle calls deliberative oratory “political speaking” (1335). He says that this type
of speech urges the audience to take or not take a particular course of action. The speaker
“aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of the proposed course of action”
(1335) by providing evidence that the results will be positive or negative, he urges
acceptance or rejection. Aristotle speaks of actions that occur in the future, not those that
have already been taken. In contrast, Dow claims that the aim of deliberative strategies in
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crisis rhetoric is to gain public support for the actions already taken (302). This type of
discourse, according to Dow, must highlight the “deliberative characteristic of the
process, in order to reassure a democratic society that has negative memories of secret
wars” (302). In essence, she is not asking the audience to determine what action should
be taken, but to support the president, whether or not the audience agrees with the action.
This would lead to the idea that the oratory could assume a forensic approach.
Forensic
According to Aristotle, forensic oratory “either attacks or defends-somebody” (1335).
It is the goal of the orator to establish that the action taken is either justified or not.
M odem presidents who face international crisis use their executive powers to act prior to
convincing Congress or the public of the necessity to take military action against an
unprovoked attack on innocent people. The ultimate objective is to convince the
Congress and the public that their actions were justified.
The examination of each of the texts will show that each of the strategies, epideictic
strategies that Dow describes as fulfilling a function of allowing the audiences to
understand the events that have occurred, deliberative strategies that urge a specific
course of action, and forensic strategies that convince the audience that the only course of
action that could have been pursued was justified, are present in presidential international
crisis rhetoric.
W ilson’s April 2, 1917, Speech
In my opinion, W oodrow W ilson was the most eloquent of the three presidents whose
speeches are analyzed in this study. A scholar of rhetoric, Wilson is credited with
changing how presidents com municated with Congress and the American public. James
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w. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis and Joseph M. Bessette say that W ilson’s view
of presidential speech is that it should articulate what is in peoples’ hearts (9). They state
that:
The W ilsonian concept of the rhetorical presidency consists of two
interfused elements. First, the President should em ploy oratory to create an
active public opinion that, if necessary, will pressure the Congress into
accepting his program: ‘he [the President] has no means of compelling
Congress except through public opinion.’ In advancing policy,
deliberative, intra-branch rhetoric thus becomes secondary to popular
rhetoric, and the president speaks to Congress not directly, but through his
popular addresses. Second, in order to reach and move the public, the
character of the rhetoric must tap the public’s feelings and articulate its
wishes. (10)
W ilson’s April 2, 1917, speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war against
Germany not only reiterates the events that have lead up to the need for the discourse, but
also reveals strategies that Dow says assigns a communal meaning to the events. The
beginning of W ilson’s speech reveals Condit’s definition/understanding functional pair.
At the start of his speech. President W ilson describes the events that have taken place
over the preceding two months during which German submarines had sunk ships in the
M editerranean. W ilson wanted to keep America out of the war, but there no longer
seemed a choice. While innocent American lives were being taken,
Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo,
their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom [of
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the sea] without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those
on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents
[sic]. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved
and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe
conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself
and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk
with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle, (par. 2)
Dow contends that even though the majority of the audience may not be involved in
the crisis, there is still a need for communal understanding because of the confusion
created by the events. The nation as a whole needs to understand how the nation will
proceed. In addition, there is a need for the discourse to “disassociate the nation from
responsibility for the crisis” (297). Wilson points out that American ships, “vessels of
every kind . . . vessels of friendly neutrals . . . hospital ships” were sunk, not by ships
manned by Americans, but by the Germans.
Wilson describes the infiltration of spies to America at the beginning of the war that
were under the “direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the
Government of the United States” (par. 12). It is not America’s fault that it has been put
in a position of defending its freedom and democracy, nor is it the fault of the people of
Germany “but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and
told its people nothing” (par. 12). He tells his audience that the German government has
no intent on being a friend to the United States, and that it will “act against our peace and
security at its convenience” (par. 12).
W ilson describes neutrality as “no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the
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world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and
freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which
is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people” (par. 8). He reminds his
audience that it is not the fault of the German people, but of their government. He says,
“We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship,” and reminds
them that the German government made the decision to take their country to war, “war
determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when
peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the
interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use
their fellow men as pawns and tools” (par. 9).
Wilson believed that it was the president’s responsibility to use presidential rhetorical
power to instill in the minds of an American community the “meaning of America”
(Andrews 132). In many of his speeches to the American public, Wilson “stressed the
need for unity and expanded and refined our notions of uniqueness” (132). America was
considered a “melting pot” of all nations. Andrews discusses the Americanization
movement, describing it as reflecting “a feeling that homogeneity was a prerequisite of
true unity and thus true nationhood” (136). Wilson furthered clarified this concept in his
speech The Heroes o f Vera Cruz when he said:
Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American
blood, which is not drawn from any one country, which is not drawn from
any one stock, which is not drawn from language of the modem world; but
free men everywhere have sent their sons and their brothers and their
daughters to this country in order to make a compounded Nation [sic]
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which consists of all the sturdy elements and all of the best elements of the
whole globe. (104)
In his first inaugural address, W ilson defined American standards as those of “justice and
fair play” (3). Then, in a speech at Soldier’s Memorial Hall, Pittsburg, on January 29,
1916, W ilson stated, “America was bom into the world to do mankind service, and no
man [sic] is a true American in whom the desire to do mankind service does not take
precedence over the desire to serve h im se lf’ (26).
We can identify early in W ilson’s speech the functional pair of shaping and sharing of
community. Wilson talks about honor and democracy, and argues that, “only free peoples
can hold their purpose and their honour [sic] steady to a common end and prefer the
interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own (par. 10). This passage serves to
remind the audience of the American values that W ilson defined throughout his
presidential rhetoric. Then, W ilson introduces “a fit partner for a league of honour” [sic]
(par. 11) when he talks about how Russian people are fighting for freedom, justice and
peace in the world. He asks, “Does not every American feel assurance has been added to
our hope for the future [. ..] ? ” (par. I I ) as a result of what was happening in Russia.
This gives a sense of sharing to the audience.
What Wilson needed to achieve next was to describe what the role of the United
States and its people entailed. He stated, “We are but one of the champions of the rights
of mankind” (par. 13). America would fight for world freedom and ultimate world
peace, even for the German people. The United States, he says, will continue to,
fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts - for
democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice
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in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for
a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free,
(par. 13)
W ilson also addressed the fact that many German bom people living in the United States
will continue to be treated with friendship and respect. Speaking to the good of the
American people, he describes them as, “most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if
they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with
us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose” (16).
Yet, he also warns, “If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of
stem repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without
countenance except from a lawless and malignant few” (par. 16).
Finally, W ilson advises Congress that there are many sacrifices that will be made by
Americans. He states that while the act of war is frightening, especially for people who
have lived in a peaceful democracy, he believes that “civilization its e lf’ seems to be in
the balance (par. 17). W ilson concludes by repeating the values of the American people
by stating.
W e shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our
hearts - for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to
have a voice in their own govem ments, for the rights and liberties of small
nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples
as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at
last free. (par. 17)
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President W ilson’s speech using the epideictic function of crisis rhetoric also fulfilled
Condit definition of “eloquence,” which is evidenced in the press’ assessment of the
speech as summarized by The New York Times on April 3, 1917. The Times ran excerpts
from 26 newspapers in 18 cities across the United States. A headline from The New York
City Tribune states, ‘“ No Praise too H igh’ for W ilson.” The paper is quoted as saying
“The judgm ents of the moment are frequently of but transitory value. Yet, reading
President W ilson’s message to Congress at the moment of its delivery to Congress, it
seems one of the great documents of history, re-echoing in a new and yet the original
spirit, the great words of Lincoln, ‘With malice to none.’” The Providence Journal called
the speech “A M ost Noble Utterance, “ and The Baltimore American called the speech as
one of “the most impressive human appeals ever delivered.”
In the effort to convince the Congress to declare war against Germany, Wilson also
uses deliberative strategies. He explains that his previous request to Congress on
February 26, 1917, that A m erica’s ships arm themselves to defend against any attacks by
the Germans at sea, appears to be impractical (par. 5). He further explains that the United
States has no choice but to defend itself against attacks by stating, “Armed neutrality is
ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is
worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is
practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of
belligerents” (par. 5). W ilson believed that America was better off taking a strong
position against the enemy because of its mission to lead and serve mankind in the quest
for freedom.
While W ilson used his rhetorical talents to convince Congress to declare war on
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Germany, George H. W. Bush faced the challenge of convincing the American public
that, in his role as Commander-in-Chief, he had taken appropriate military action in
Kuwait. This situation is examined next as we apply the forensic framework to George
H. W. B ush’s speech.

George H. W. B ush’s January 16, 1991, Speech
As presented in Chapter 3, George H. W. B ush’s rhetorical problem was the public’s
perception that American involvement in an attack on a foreign country by another
foreign country would be like Am erica’s long involvement in Viet Nam. President Bush
needed to convince the American public that, under the circumstances of the situation,
the decision to send American troops to the M iddle East is justified and that America
would not experience another Viet Nam.
Bush began his speech by notifying the audience of the action already taken on
military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Unlike Wilson, Bush addressed the public through
mass media - national television and radio - recounting the activities of Saddam
H ussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. He also outlined the diplomatic activities
of the United States along with the United Nations, and many other countries to restore
order and peace to the M iddle East. Bush said that people from other nations also tried to
reason with Hussein, to no avail, leaving no choice “but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by
force” (par. 4).
He continued his remarks to inform the audience of the military activities occurring in
Iraq as he spoke. He furthered the rationale by telling the audience of the intent to destroy
H ussein’s arsenal of artillery, and nuclear and chemical weapons, in order to protect the
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lives of the coalition forces. Bush also posed the questions of “Why act now? Why not
wait?” (par. 7) in anticipation of what he though the public would ask. Saying that, “The
world could wait no longer” (par. 7), he began to explain the situation that required the
actions currently in progress, in answer to those questions.
Using an effective technique of repetition. Bush explains what had occurred to
reinforce the need to act. He stated:
W hile the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped,
pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected
the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities - and among those maimed
and murdered, innocent children, (par.8)
W hile the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical
weapons arsenal he now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon
of mass destruction — a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited,
while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and
moved massive forces into Kuwait, (par. 9)
W hile the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was
being done to the fragile economies of the Third W orld, emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own
economy, (par. 10)
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace
with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared
for war. (par. 12)
The first piece of evidence offered to justify this military action speaks to the basic
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values of life in America. Crimes against innocent children are incomprehensible. A
crime against a child brings mothers and fathers together to punish the offender. Then,
Imagine the fear created by the thought of America as we know it the target of a nuclear
bomb! This is another piece of evidence to justify sending troops to Kuwait. Sending
our troops to defeat the enemy was the only choice he had. While not wanting this action
to seem to be about money. Bush did make a plea to the common sense of the people that
our economy was just as much at risk as that of the M iddle Eastern countries who were
adopting American values. Finally, Bush portrays Hussein as a war monger and the rest
of the world as a peace loving people.
Bush explains the that the action was rational by saying that, when Hussein was
repeatedly warned by the United Nations to either leave Kuwait or he would come under
attack, “ [Saddam] has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead, he tried to make this a
dispute between Iraq and the United States of Am erica” (par. 14).
In his attempt to reassure the American public that he did not want a prolonged battle
that resulted in the loss of American lives on foreign soil. Bush said;
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military
commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible,
and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied
service men and women. I ’ve told the American people before that this
will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will
have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be
asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I ’m hopeful that this
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fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an
absolute minimum, (par. 16)
As stated earlier in this paper, Am erican’s feelings against the war in Vietnam were
still strong. In the preceding passage. Bush reassures Americans that he is doing
everything he can to keep the soldiers safe. Yet, as all people know, lives will be lost,
regardless of his instructions to military commanders.
An im portant part of this crisis rhetoric is to assure the audience that all is being done
to make sure that the loss of life will be minimal, and that American soldiers believe in
the action. Bush uses remarks from a number of the soldiers to show support for the
military action described in his discourse. He says.
Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, M arine lance corporal. He says, ‘L et’s
free these people, so we can go home and be free again;’ Listen to one of,
our great officers out there. M arine Lieutenant General W alter Boomer.
He said: ‘There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality
and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn’t the kind of world w e’re
going to want to live in;’ Listen to M aster Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82d
Airborne: ‘W e’re here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. W hat
w e’re doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years.
It’s better to deal with this guy now than 5 years from now ;’ and we
should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she
says, ‘If we let him get away with this, who knows w hat’s going to be
n ex t’? (pars.2 1 - 24).
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This passage speaks to the character of Americans and our beliefs in freedom,
democracy, and responsibility as world leaders.
Analysis of this speech revealed that we can add a third framework to the study of
presidential international crisis rhetoric. In fairness to Dow, this discourse was delivered
after her 1989 study. It does not fit into the definition of deliberative rhetoric because it
was delivered after a decision was made and to gain support for having made the
decision. However, the next piece of rhetorical discourse offers examples of deliberative
as well as forensic and epideictic strategies.

George W. B ush’s September 20, 2001, Speech
On September I I , 2001, America was attacked by a faceless enemy and its citizens
were shocked, confused and frightened. We looked to the country’s leader. President
George W. Bush, to explain to us why these attacks occurred and what we were going to
do next. The President’s speech from the W hitehouse the night of the attacks was weak.
A report in the New York Times stated that “advisors to the administration said the
speech fell flat, that it failed to meet either the magnitude of the day’s events or the nature
of the task ahead” (Sanger and Van Natta Jr.). B ush’s speech writers composed a speech
to be read at the National Cathedral three days later, yet it too did not meet expectations.
New York Times reporter D. T. Max stated that, “the beautiful speech sounded borrowed
coming from B ush’s mouth.” However, the speech that Bush prepared with his writers
and delivered on September 20, 2001 to a national television audience and members of
Congress was “a fitting response” (Bitzer 10) to the September I Ith attacks on America.
Americans needed their President to explain the events of September I I , 2001. We
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knew that passenger airliners flew into buildings and a field, causing explosions, fire and
the loss of lives, but we did not know why and we did not know what to do. We needed
answers.Condit says, “W henever change intrudes into the com m unity’s life, the
epideictic speaker will be called forth by the com m unity to help discover what the event
means to the community, and what the community will come to be in the face of the new
event” (289). Justly, Dow tells us that epideictic rhetoric is a fitting response for a
national crisis because “the community has experienced a loss” (297).
According to Condit, epideictic speeches contain elements of praise and blame. “The
community renews its conception of good and evil by explaining what is has previously
held to be good or evil and by working through relationships of those past values and
beliefs with new situations” (291). Bush says.
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war
against our country. Americans have known wars —but for the past 136
years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.
Americans have known the casualties of war —but not at the center of a
great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks - but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon
us in a single day — and night fell on a different world, a world where
freedom itself is under attack, (par. 11)
The first functional pair of epideictic rhetoric, definition and understanding is
evidenced in B ush’s speech. He helps us to understand the situation, not only by
acknowledging what happened, but also what was going to happen by including the
questions Americans were asking in his discourse: “who attacked our country?” (par. 12),
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“why do they hate us?” (par. 23), “how will we fight and win this w ar?” (par. 27), and
“what is expected of us?” (par. 35).
In answer to the first question of who attacked us. Bush begins building a case against
a group of terrorists known al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. He tells his
audience of the organization’s extreme differences to our com m unity’s values of freedom
and peace. Bush states, “AI Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is
not making money; its goal is remaking the world —and imposing its radical beliefs on
people everyw here” (par. 13). Then he says, “The terrorists’ directive commands them to
kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military
and civilians, including women and children” (par. 14).
The second question Bush posses is, “why do they hate us?” The answer to this
question is not only for Americans, but for people in other countries who share some of
the same values. He begins by addressing the American people with, “They hate what we
see right here in this cham ber —a dem ocratically elected government. Their leaders are
self-appointed. They hate our freedoms —our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech,
our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (par. 23). Then, he
speaks to his national audience and says, “They want to overthrow existing govemments
in many M uslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive
Israel out of the M iddle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions
of Asia and Africa” (par. 24). He turns back to Americans and says that the terrorists
want to end a way of life and by their horrific actions, hope that America will retreat from
its position as a powerful nation (par. 25). For me, the answer for America to this
question is simply - they hate our freedoms.
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It is with B ush’s answer to the third question where I argue that the rhetoric changes
its strategy from epideictic to forensic. “How will we fight and win this w ar?” asks Bush
on behalf of the American people. This is the point where Bush tells America and the
world what has already been done.
Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state
and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security.
These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I
announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me
- the Office of Homeland Security. M any will be involved in this effort,
from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called
to active duty. . . And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I
have a message for our military: Be ready. I ’ve called the Armed Forces
to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act,
and you will make us proud, (pars. 29 and 31)
In essence. Bush has just put us on notice that we are, again, at war in a foreign land. He
told his audience that the war was not going to end quickly, and it would involve
Americans losing their lives in combat. He says, “Americans should not expect one
battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include
dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success” (par. 28).
Bush began making his case early in the speech when he states, “Tonight we are a
country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger,
and anger to resolution. W hether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our
enemies, justice will be done” (par. 5).
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Dow says that effective discourse must clearly show that the action is legal, justified
by the situation, and prudent (306). Bush points out that all of the evidence gathered
points to al Qaeda, the same group that had been indicted for the bombings of the USS
Cole and American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (par. 12). He also states that, “The
leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban
regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Q aeda’s vision for
the world” (par. 16). Bush makes his point very clear. “Our war on terror begins with al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach
has been found, stopped and defeated” (par. 22). He says later in the speech, “These
measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life
is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows” (par. 31).
Finally, Bush answers the forth question: “W hat is expected of us?” He then uses
deliberative strategies as he advises Americans “to live their lives, and hug your children”
(par. 35) even though there is fear and trepidation. He asks them to “uphold the values of
America” (par. 35) to continue supporting the victims of the tragedy, cooperate with
investigators, and be patient with tightened security measures. Bush has just reunited the
country.
M oving back to epideictic strategies, most surprisingly. Bush also satisfies C ondit’s
third functional pair of epideictic discourse, display and entertainment. Bush used this
strategy to identify with the audience and help them feel a sense of community by a
display of compassion. Bush held up the badge of police officer, George Howard, a hero
who died trying to save victims of the W orld Trade Center bombings. Bush says, “It [the
badge] was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my
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reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. I will not forget this wound to
our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in
waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people” (pars. 50 and 51).
Condit says that, “M any ceremonial occasions invite the speaker to display her or his
eloquence. ‘Eloquence’ is the combination of truth, beauty and power in human speech,
and is a unique capacity of hum anity” . . . The audience is ‘entertained’ by such speech in
a most humane manner . . . allowed to stretch their daily experience into meaning more
grand, sweet, [and] noble . . (290). Equally important, Condit says, is that, “audiences
rightfully take eloquence as a sign of leadership” (291). According to Max, Bush
succeeded in showing the country and the world at large that he was a strong leader. The
speech was deemed “a good and strong speech” by John F. Kennedy’s speech writer, Ted
Sorensen (Max 8).
C ondit’s functional pair of shaping and sharing community in epideictic rhetoric is
also apparent in the speech. Bush gives us a sense of community by talking about the
“courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground,” “the
endurance of rescue workers, working past exhaustion,” “the unfurling of flags, the
lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers,” and “giving and loving
people who have made the grief of strangers their own” (pars. 2-3). He brings to the
forefront American values of strength, freedom and justice. Dow says, “The community
renews its conception of itself and of what is good by explaining what it has previously
held to be good and by working through the relationships of those past values and beliefs
to new situations (289).
B ush’s speech was able to explain to Americans what occurred on September 11,
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2001, on American soil, to reunite Americans as a community with shared beliefs and
values, and to also persuade the world at large that the actions against the terrorists
responsible for the destruction of property in America and the taking of human lives
throughout the world was the right course of action. Bush had managed to calm the
people of America and establish him self as their leader. According to Max, “Ted
Kennedy said, ‘The president’s speech was exactly what the nation needed - a message
of determination and hope, strength and com passion’” (7).

Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed three speeches from three United States Presidents who
faced three different situations, calling for three different responses. W ilson’s speech
employed epideictic and deliberative strategies to convince Congress to declare war on
Germany. George H. W. Bush’s speech employed epideictic and forensic strategies to
justify to the American people the actions taken in the Persian Gulf, and I have
demonstrated that George W. B ush’s speech employed epideictic, forensic and
deliberative strategies
When we apply a specific strategic theory to discourse, epideictic, forensic, or
deliberative, we are better able to understand how the discourse responds to different
crisis situations, as well as how it relates to the needs of different audiences.
The next chapter will discuss the results of the research and analysis of these three
pieces of presidential international crisis rhetoric. Also included is a comparison of the
language used by each o f the rhetors.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Presidential rhetoric has become one of the ways in which our nation’s leaders can
become more “human” in the eyes and ears of the American public, and to show their
strength as leaders. Presidents use rhetoric to persuade the people to accept their
responses or actions to various situations. As previously noted, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell
and Kathleen Hall Jamieson stated that modem presidential rhetoric has produced various
forms of discourse (genres) that preserve the institution of the office, while adapting it to
particular times and conditions (4). During times of crisis, the American public looks to
a president for assurance that everything will eventually be alright. Americans want an
explanation of what happened, why it happened, and what the president will do, or has
done, about it, and what the people will need to do next. How presidents articulate their
message to their audience can have either negative or positive affects on their credibility
as leader.
The study of presidential crisis rhetoric is important not only for the critic, but also
for the rhetor. As Edwin Black points out, rhetors can draw upon historical responses to
similar situations. The three speeches analyzed in this study support this concept and
assist in answering the first question posed at the beginning of this study. The question
was, “Is rhetorical history being repeated each time a situation occurs where the United
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States is faced with a threat to its position as the w orld’s most powerful nation?” Critics
are able to understand how this type of discourse is impacted by situational components
by using certain strategies in the discourse to create an effective response to the situation.
The purpose of this study was to add to the study of presidential rhetoric presented
during times of international crises in order to determine whether the discourses share
similar situational and strategic elements that are characteristic of crisis rhetoric as
reported by Bonnie Dow in 1987. Dow argues that it is important to clarify the
relationship of crisis rhetoric and the classical genres of epideictic and deliberative
discourse in order to understand the function of the discourse as it responds to.a particular
situation (297). This study reveals that presidential international crisis rhetoric uses
epideictic strategies in conjunction with deliberative strategies, or with deliberative and
forensic strategies, in order for the discourse to be effective.
Each of the situations leading up to the delivery of the discourse analyzed in this
study shared the components of an international crisis as defined by M urray Edelman,
who states that a crisis is a threat that people must face together, and that a crisis suggests
a need for unity and common sacrifice (45). President W oodrow Wilson needed to
respond to a situation where innocent Americans were killed on international waters by
enemies of freedom. Tensions between America and the German government had been
building over the course of three years. When all diplomatic attempts failed to protect
innocent people of the world. President W ilson realized that America could no longer
allow Germany to destroy A m erica’s basic principles of democracy and the rights of all
people to live in peace and safety. His request to Congress to declare war on Germany
and support sending troops to help fight for freedom of all people.
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Likewise, George H. W. Bush faced a situation where diplomatic attempts to protect
M iddle Eastern countries safe from military attacks by the maniacal leader of Iraq,
Saddam Hussein, failed. When H ussein’s military forces invaded the small country of
Kuwait, B ush’s decision to send American troops to defend the freedoms of the innocent
people in Kuwait required the president to address the people of America and the rest of
the world to explain that he needed to involve the American military in order to protect
the basis values of freedom and democracy.
W hile unlike W ilson’s and George H. W. Bush’s situations of military actions
abroad, newly elected President George W. Bush faced a situation involving an unknown
enemy attacking innocent people on American soil. The attacks on the W orld Trade
Center Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D C. were witnessed
by the television viewing audience as they occurred. Americans also saw the destruction
of another commercial airliner that had crashed in a field near Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. It
was some time before President Bush was able to deliver a speech that would help
Am erican’s to understand what had happened, why it happened, and what was going to
happen next.
Kiewe states that presidential crisis rhetoric characterizes “a unique and dynamic
process” (xvii). In order for presidents to display strong leadership qualities during
situations of crisis, they need to deliver discourse that offers comfort and understanding,
solutions to the problem or problems people will face, unite the people by addressing
basic ideals and principals, and offer justification for actions taken (Kiewe xviii). The
Analysis of the speeches by W ilson, Bush, and Bush reveals common characteristics of
presidential crisis rhetoric, and answers another question posed in this study, “Are claims
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by Dow, Campbell, Jamieson, and others concerning similarities in situation, strategic
response and needs of the audience evident in the docum ents?” This question has just
been addressed in part. The answer to the remainder of this question is provided in the
following synopses of the speeches.
W ilson’s speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war on Germany begins with
an account of the events leading up to the need for this piece of discourse. He described
the situation to Congress, telling of the attacks on innocent people in international waters
near Europe, including killing non-combatant Americans. He reminds Congress that
American citizens came from all countries to help shape the nation’s identity, and that
America basic values were democracy and peace. W ilson also describes the purpose of
being an American - to champion the cause for peace and freedom throughout the world.
These portions of the rhetoric serve to unite the people of America. W ilson also explains
that America has no choice to go to war to ensure that democracy and peace prevail, and
that there will be sacrifices to protect basic human rights. W ilson was confident in the
strength of America as a world leader, and that, while he attempted to use diplomatic
strategies, the only choice that was left was to join in the battle against an enemy of
humankind. It was evident that the rhetoric fulfilled the needs of the audience by the
responses from the pubic as reported in newspapers around the country.
When George H. W. B ush’s discourse was examined, it was found that the situation
required the president to not only assure the American public that his actions against
Saddam Hussein were justified, but that American soldiers sent to the M iddle East would
be protected and brought home quickly. America was remembering the war in Viet Nam,
and would not support similar involvement by the United States military. Bush had to
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convince the public that he had tried everything he could diplomatically to protect the
peace in the world. In recounting the actions of Hussein, he played upon the hearts of all
Americans by describing the crimes against children and innocent people of a small
country unable to defend itself. Bush had no choice but to send help. He effectively
assured the American audience that the soldiers who had been asked to fight for the right
of human freedom supported his actions. He presented a number of testimonials from the
soldiers who were sent to Kuwait to fight for American values of freedom, democracy
and responsibility as world leaders. W hile Bush did not display the eloquence of Wilson,
his speech did satisfy both epideictic and forensic characteristics found in crisis rhetoric.
The least eloquent speaker of the three was George W. Bush, and he faced the
difficult task of explaining the situation that occurred on September I I , 2001, to a
frightened, confused, and shocked America. While most of the people in America and
around the world witnessed the events on local and national television. President Bush
still had to explain what happened. M ore importantly, he needed to explain why it
happened and who was responsible. Bush also needed to explain to the people what
actions America was taking to find the person who committed the act, and at the same
time, tell the people in America how to go on living their lives after the attacks. Bush
began by describing the unity of people coming together to help the victims of the
attacks, and describing the unity of elected officials coming together on the steps of the
capital building, not as members of two different political parties, but as Americans. He
then introduced what he believed all people would ask him to explain - what happened
and why? While he responded to his own questions, he began to create a picture of what
terrorism and terrorist were, and how terrorists did not value democracy and freedom and
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peace. Then, B ush’s strategy changes in order to explain the actions he has already taken
to protect America from another attack. He notified his audience that America was again
at war in a foreign country, and it was going to last a long time. American lives would be
sacrificed for the sake of freedom and justice. He assured Americans that the enemy,
who was responsible for other terrorist attacks on American em bassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, and the bombing of the USS Cole had been identified, would be tracked down
and eliminated. He again changed his strategy to tell Americans what they needed to do
next. He told them to value their families and loved ones, to continue to support and help
the victims of the attacks, to be patient with the new security measures, and to continue to
believe in the basis values of America. President Bush fulfilled the needs of his
audience, calming the people in America and establishing him self as a leader.

Conclusion
Dow argues that crisis rhetoric, depending on the situation, requires the use of either
predominately epideictic or predominately deliberative strategies. This study has shown
that in each situation, the president used epideictic strategies to explain the situation, but
also used either or both deliberative or forensic strategies to make the rhetoric effective.
For example, W ilson’s speech, eliminating the portions of his rhetoric implemented
deliberative strategies to convince Congress to declare war on Germany would have
resulted in failure. Likewise, George H. W. Bush needed to persuade the American
public that his decision to attack Iraq was in the best interest of freedom for all people.
Although this speech included the use of epideictic strategies present in all crisis rhetoric,
forensic strategies were used to defend actions he had already taken. Finally, George W.
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Bush faced the situation of not only using his rhetoric to comfort American citizens by
the use of epideictic strategies, and of using forensic strategies to explain the actions
taken, his discourse also used deliberative strategies to reunited Americans by explaining
what they should do next.
Dow made the distinction that epideictic rhetoric should not be treated as a specific
genre, but referred to as a certain strategy that serves a specific function, and that
deliberative rhetoric is not limited to discuss policy (308) but is also used as a strategy in
certain situations. However, Dow limited the strategies found in presidential crisis
rhetoric to only those of epideictic and deliberative. This study of presidential
international crisis rhetoric offers evidence that more than one type of strategy may be
required because of the situation leading up to the rhetorical discourse, which is
important in extending the a critic’s approach in analyzing presidential international crisis
rhetoric.
This brings us to the last question presented for this study, “Does this study offer
opportunities for further research?” The answer is yes. The people of America will
continue to experience the consequences of decisions made by our country’s leaders in
Washington, D.C. The United States is currently at war with terrorism, and our country’s
military forces are fighting for the freedom of people in Iraq. These situations will
demand that President George W. Bush continue to reassure people in American and the
world at large that he is doing what is necessary for the good of all people, based on
Am erica’s basic value of freedom for all. Critics of presidential crisis rhetoric will find,
through the study of speeches yet to be delivered, that the discourse will employ
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epideictic strategies in combination with deliberative and forensic strategies to fulfill the
purpose of the discourse.
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APPENDIX I

President W oodrow Wilson's W ar Message
Delivered 2 April, 1917
Gentlemen of the Congress:
I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very
serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right
nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.
On the 3d of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary
announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the 1st day of
February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its
submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain
and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies
of Germany within the M editerranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German
submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial
Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity
with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due
warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy,
when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were
given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken
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were meagre and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance
in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was
observed The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind,
whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been
ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for
those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even
hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of
Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe-conduct through the proscribed areas
by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of
identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.
I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any
government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations.
International law had its origin in the at tempt to set up some law which would be
respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where
lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up,
with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be
accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of
mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside
under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could
use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without
throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that
were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss
of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and
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wholesale destruction of the lives of noncombatants, men, women, and children, engaged
in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modem history, been
deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and
innocent people can not be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is
a warfare against mankind.
It is a w ar against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken,
in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other
neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same
way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation
must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be
made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgm ent befitting our
character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will
not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the
vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.
When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of Eebruary last, I thought that it would
suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful
interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed
neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws
when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is
impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that
merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving
chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity
indeed, to endeavour to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They
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must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the
right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed,
even in the defense of rights which no modem publicist has ever before questioned their
right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed
on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt
with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such
circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely
only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the
war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we
can not make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and
suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The
wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the
very roots of human life.
W ith a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am
taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to
what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course
of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the
Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of
belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it, and that it take im mediate steps not only to
put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and
employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end
the war.
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What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in
counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to
that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that
our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization
and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of
war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most
economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of
the Navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing
with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces
of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least 500,000 men, who
should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and
also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they
may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting
of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be
sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation....
While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and
make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought
has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last
two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or
clouded by them I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I
addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I
addressed the Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object
now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as
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against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and selfgoverned peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth
ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable
where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace
to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by
organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people.
W e have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an
age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility
for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed
among the individual citizens of civilized states.
We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but
one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government
acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a
war determined upon as wars used to be determ ined upon in the old, unhappy days when
peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the
interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use
their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbour
states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of
affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs
can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask
questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from
generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the
privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged
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class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full
information concerning all the nation's affairs.
A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of
democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or
observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue
would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would
and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free
peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the
interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.
Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the
future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been
happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it
best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought,
in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their
habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political
structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact
Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great,
generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the
forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit
partner for a league of honour.
One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not
and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled
our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set
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criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace
within and without our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its
spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a m atter of conjecture
but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once
come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country
have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal
direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of
the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have
sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that
their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us
(who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish
designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they
have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no
real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience.
That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted
[ZimmeiTnannl note to the German M inister at M exico City is eloquent evidence.
We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a
government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the
presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what
purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world.
We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if
necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its
power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them.

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the
German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of
men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made
safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political
liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. W e desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek
no indemnities for ourselves, no material com pensation for the sacrifices we shall freely
make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied
when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can
make them.
Just because we fight without rancour and without selfish object, seeking nothing for
ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident,
conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud
punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.
I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of
Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right
and our honour. The Austro-Hungarian Governm ent has, indeed, avowed its unqualified
endorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now
without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been
possible for this Government to receive Count Tam owski, the Ambassador recently
accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of AustriaHungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the
United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a
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discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where
we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.
It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of
right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with
the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to
an inesponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and
of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the
German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate
relations of mutual advantage between us —however hard it may be for them, for the
time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their
present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship —
exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We
shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and
actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy,
who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who
are in fact loyal to their neighbours and to the Government in the hour of test. They are,
most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or
allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who
may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with
with a firm hand of stem repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here
and there and without countenance except from a lawless and m alignant few.
It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have
performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and
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sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into
the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the
balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which
we have always carried nearest our hearts - for democracy, for the right of those who
submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties
of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as
shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a
task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything
that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is
privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and
happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

Wilson, Woodrow. “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress.” April 2, I9 I7 . in
United States Presidents (I9 I3 -I9 2 I: Wilson). President W ilson’s State Papers and
Addresses. New York: The Review of Reviews Company, I9I7.
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APPENDIX II

President George H. W. B ush’s Address to the Nation
Announcing Allied M ilitary Action
in the Persian G ulf Delivered
January 16, I99I
Just 2 hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and
Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged.
This conflict started August 2d when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless
neighbor. Kuwait — a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations —
was crushed; its people, brutalized. Eive months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel
war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined.
This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the
consent of the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless
diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States, and many, many
other countries. Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to
conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to
Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James
Baker, held an historic meeting in Geneva, only to be totally rebuffed. This past weekend,
in a last-ditch effort, the Secretary-General of the United Nations went to the M iddle East
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with peace in his heart — his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with
no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.
Now the 28 countries with forces in the G ulf area have exhausted all reasonable
efforts to reach a peaceful resolution —have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait
by force. We will not fail.
As I report to you, air attacks are underway against military targets in Iraq. W e are
determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy
his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed.
Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by
targeting Saddam's vast military arsenal. Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are
that our operations are proceeding according to plan.
Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate
government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again
be free. Iraq will eventually com ply with all relevant United Nations resolutions, and
then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and
cooperative m ember of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of
the Gulf.
Some may ask: W hy act now? W hy not wait? The answer is clear: The world could
wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing
their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over 5 months, and we and our allies
concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.
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While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and
plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to
unspeakable atrocities — and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.
W hile the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he
now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction —a nuclear
weapon. And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal,
Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait.
W hile the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the
fragile econom ies of the Third W orld, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the
entire world, including to our own economy.
The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our
disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by
stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations, he could weaken the forces
arrayed against him.
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open
contempt. W hile the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.
I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute
action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in
accord with the United Nation resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained
intransigent, certain that time was on his side.
Saddam was warned over and over again to com ply with the will of the United
Nations: Leave Kuwait, or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings.
Instead, he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.
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Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations - countries from 5 continents, Europe and Asia,
Africa, and the Arab League - have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder
against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided.
Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military com manders to take
every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of
protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I've told the
American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here
tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will
not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I'm hopeful that this fighting
will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.
This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending
the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for
ourselves and for future generations a new world order —a world where the rule of law,
not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful —and
we will be —we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible
United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the
U.N.'s founders.
We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this
conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of
Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their
dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait, and let Iraq itself rejoin the family
of peace-loving nations.
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Thomas Paine wrote many years ago; "T h ese are the times that try men's souls."
Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational
forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we
will prevail but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation
can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its
neighbor.
No President can easily com mit our sons and daughters to war. They are the Nation's
finest. Ours is an all-volunteer force, magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops
know why they're there. And listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any
President or Prime M inister ever could.
Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, M arine lance corporal. He says, "L et's free these
people, so we can go home and be free again." And he's right. The terrible crimes and
tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an
affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.
Listen to one of our great officers out there. M arine Lieutenant General W alter
Boomer. He said: "T h ere are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and
lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to
live in."
Listen to M aster Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82d Airborne: "W e're here for more
than just the price of a gallon of gas. W hat we're doing is going to chart the future of the
world for the next 100 years. It's better to deal with this guy now than 5 years from now."
And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when
she says, " I f we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"
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I have called upon Hollywood and W alter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous
comrades-in-arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply
grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching
tonight: When the troops we've sent in finish their work, I am determined to bring them
home as soon as possible.
Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. M ay God bless
each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the Gulf, and may He
continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.
Note: President Bush spoke at 9:01 p.m. from the Oval Office at the W hite House. In
his address, he referred to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq; Secretary of State James A.
Baker III; United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra; and
Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, com mander of the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The
address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television.

Bush, George H. W. “Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian G ulf Crisis, 5 Jan
1991.” < http://bushlibrarv.tam u.edu/papers/I99I/9I0I0500.htm l.> 7 April 2004.
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APPENDIX III

President George W. B ush’s Address to a Joint Session
of Congress and the American People
Delivered September 20, 2001
Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans:
In the normal course of events. Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state
of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the
American people.
We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on
the ground —passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you
please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight.
We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past
exhaustion. W e have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of
blood, the saying of prayers - in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the
decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.
My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state
of our Union — and it is strong.
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our
grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. W hether we bring our enemies to
justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.
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I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was
touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together
on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America." And you did more than sing;
you acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our
military.
Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, M ajority Leader Daschle and Senator
Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our
country.
And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of
support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at
Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate.
We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in
Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget
moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.
Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own: dozens of
Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women from
El Salvador, Iran, M exico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no
truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause —so
honored the British Prime M inister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose
with America. Thank you for coming, friend. On September the I Ith, enemies of
freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars —
but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in
1941. Americans have known the casualties of war —but not at the center of a great city
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on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks —but never before on
thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day —and night fell on
a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.
Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our
country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated
terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for
bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the
USS Cole.
Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its
goal is rem aking the world —and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by
M uslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics — a fringe movement that
perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill
Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and
civilians, including women and children.
This group and its leader —a person named Osama bin Laden — are linked to many
other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the
Islamic M ovem ent of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60
countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to
camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are
sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and
destruction.
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The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the
Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's
vision for the world.
Afghanistan's people have been brutalized —many are starving and many have
fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a
television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in
Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.
The United States respects the people of Afghanistan —after all, we are currently its
largest source of humanitarian aid — but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only
repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and
sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is
committing murder.
And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the
Taliban; Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your
land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly
imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your
country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to
appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so
we can make sure they are no longer operating.
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and
act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.
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I also want to speak tonight directly to M uslims throughout the world. W e respect
your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in
countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those
who com mit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are
traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America
is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical
network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.
Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this
cham ber - a dem ocratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They
hate our freedoms —our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote
and assemble and disagree with each other.
They want to overthrow existing governments in many M uslim countries, such as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the M iddle East. They
want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.
These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With
every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and
forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.
We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. W e have seen their kind
before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By
sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions —by abandoning every value except
the will to power - they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and
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totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's
unmarked grave of discarded lies.
Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every
resource at our com mand - every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of
war —to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.
This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation
of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two
years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in
combat.
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated
strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any
other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert
operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one
against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And
we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take
defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal
departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities
affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So
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tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me —the
Office of Homeland Security.
And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to
strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a
trusted friend —Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge. He will lead, oversee and coordinate a
comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond
to any attacks that may come.
These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our
way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.
Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the
reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our
prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our
military: Be ready. I've called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour
is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.
This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's
freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.
We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police
forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is
grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded - with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to
Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the
world: An attack on one is an attack on all.
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The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror
goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered,
can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate
governments. And you know what —we're not going to allow it.
Americans are asking: W hat is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug
your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and
resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.
I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come
here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by
them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their
ethnic background or religious faith.
I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your
contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information,
libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need
your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.
I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany
tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.
I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American
economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its
source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of
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our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and
they are our strengths today. (Applause.)
And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for
those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will
help strengthen us for the journey ahead.
Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what
you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their
representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together.
Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to
improve air safety, to dramatically expand the num ber of air marshals on domestic
flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote
stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency.
We will come together to give law enforcem ent the additional tools it needs to track
down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence
capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they
strike.
We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and
put our people back to work.
Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New
Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and M ayor Rudolph Giuliani. As a symbol of
America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress, and these two leaders, to
show the world that we will rebuild New York City.
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After all that has just passed - all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes
that died with them - it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some
speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this
country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of
America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of
liberty, here and across the world.
Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and
anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The
advance of human freedom —the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of
every time — now depends on us. Our nation —this generation — will lift a dark threat of
violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our
efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.
It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to
normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes
with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will rem em ber what
happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news
came — where we were and what we were doing. Some will rem em ber an image of a
fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.
And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who
died at the W orld Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom,
Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a
task that does not end.
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I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I
will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the
American people.
The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear,
justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral
between them.
Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice — assured of the rightness of
our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God
grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.
Thank you.

Bush, George W. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.
January 20, 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2001/09/print/200109208.html>. 26 July 2004.
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